

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

25X1

8 June 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, JOTP/OTR

SUBJECT: Report of [] on his present training position

25X1

1. This report is intended to cover the period of my assignment to the [] from 15 August 1955 to the present.

25X1

2. In August, 1955, I chose to work on the [] desk after a careful weighing of the considerations involved in getting a large amount of work probable on a newly formed desk like that of [] as opposed to the net advantages of getting experienced supervision and less responsibility characteristic of a longer operating desk. My decision has proved to be a valid one. My assignment has resulted in a variety of functions commencing as an assistant FI case officers handling various projects, proceeding to act as CE officer in the desk CE officer's absence, then returning to work as an assistant FI case officer, and from 5 January functioning as the desk PP officer for seventeen weeks while the desk PP officer was in training. This experience has been invaluable in getting a close, active look at the main sectors of Headquarters covert activities. It, of course, has been trying in that I have lacked experience and training in these functions. But this lack has presented no real problem, for any decisions which have fallen into my province have been carefully supervised. The big disadvantage is that the knowledge one gains from contact with case officers with extensive field experience has been lacking until recently. This lack in turn has promoted more original thought than would have been the case had there been officers with extensive area and field experience present as my supervisors or associates.

25X1

25X1

3. Headquarters functioning appears to require more a knowledge of FI, PP, and CE targets and of bureaucratic methods than of straight FI, PP, or CE techniques which for the purpose of Headquarters can be mastered by reason and imagination. I, therefore, would recommend that the first assignment of a JOT be to a desk similar to the [] one. This assignment should be previous to the taking of the seventeen week training course in operational techniques and be for a few months. As in my case, this type of assignment would have the definite advantage of equipping and initiate with a broad picture and understanding of Agency covert activities before commitment to a specific assignment.

25X1

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

4. As this report is my only one on my assignment with the Agency, I think it appropriate at this time to include my comments on my reasons for leaving the Agency. Originally this decision was motivated by a feeling of responsibility to my family and its business interests. However, this decision has been enforced in recent months by a growing conviction that the challenge of running a small business would be greater than that of a career with CIA. Evidently the principle behind this thought is not original; for I recall Mr. Baird stating that the fault for any JOT's leaving the Agency lies not in the JOT program or in the original selection of JOT's but in the failure of the Agency to provide most young men with sufficient challenge to retain their services.

5. Since this problem of attracting and retaining young, able men is a problem common to all government services, my views on how the Agency fails to provide a challenge may possibly be of interest. I should preface these views by declaring that the Agency has a fascinating and most worthwhile function in our government. I should say too that my views are limited by my not having had field experience. Any criticism is meant to be constructive, it being motivated only by a desire for greater insight into this problem of career personnel. It certainly is not intended to be personal, for I believe my supervisors and most other people I have dealt with to be conscientious and devoted, intelligent and able civil servants. Lastly, my comments are restricted personnel and administrative matters and not to decisions involving actual operations because of my relative inexperience in these matters. Of course, I have my own thoughts on operational matters, but as an employee subject to present personnel and administrative practices, I feel I am on much sounder ground in a discussion of only these matters.

6. The failure of Headquarters work to provide a challenge is manifested in the sphere of employee morale which has more than a healthy share of discouragement and apathy and which certainly is not the best for an efficiently functioning organization. What is needed is the feeling of being a part of an elite with an important job to be done--the feeling that one's work is necessary, vital, and even urgent. Government service cannot reward its employees with large incomes. Nor can employees of the covert side of CIA claim the prestige of job or organization as a reward, for these items should remain secret. Therefore the reward of the employees of the covert side of CIA must be mainly psychic--personal pride in their work or in that of their organization. It must lie in job gratification arising from work and its product.

7. To the development of this pride, the Agency presents many stumbling blocks and obstacles. Some of them follow:

- 2 -

SECRET

a. The excessive number of employees. The number is excessive from a psychological point of view in that the employee fails to develop a feeling of belonging and being important to the organization. It is excessive from a point of view of efficiency. Efficient operation is slowed by the large number of people to be consulted on a single problem, by the conflicts in responsibility between various sections within the covert side, and by the large amount of required paper work. Also the work load of the Headquarters part of covert activities is not enough to require the present large number of employees. Individual work load admittedly varies from day to day in an organization of this type, but many honest employees will admit that they do not have enough to do and fill in their time searching for many miscellaneous, extraneous tasks or in prolonging the tasks they have. Some of the fault for the excessive number of personnel lies in the general willingness of officials to make work for each other and in the prevalent tendency of supervisors to overestimate the work load of their section and their need for subordinate personnel (empire building).

b. The unnecessarily heavy reliance on memoranda and other paper for communication between various organizational components. This reliance is frustrating in that one often feels a verbal request or answer should be enough to initiate or complete an action. Even for simple matters of no consequence, this use of memorandum requires a rough draft to be approved by the desk chief, typing by a typist, and reading and approval of the desk, branch, and division chiefs. It would appear that if a cable can be coordinated by phone, much of the simple business inside Headquarters could be performed in the same way or at least by hand written memo forms used by the desk officer receiving the information or request. Much of the work of this Agency is based upon the reading and preparing of memoranda.

c. The large number of staffs on an upper level. These staffs generally serve no useful purpose except to increase the work load of the geographical working desk by demanding more paper from them for information purposes, by duplicating their functions, or by furnishing advice or guidance which often is outdated, petty, or not cognizant of area problems. Officers of a high grade should be used on the working desks where their experience can be of immediate operational value instead of being employed on a staff level where they are more of a hindrance than help and a needlessly large expense.

d. The retention of incompetent or barely satisfactory personnel. Perhaps this fault is inherent in any large organization with civil service regulations; but in this organization which boasts of its excellence, it is annoying to watch individuals who out of sheer incompetence or lack of motivation fail to carry their share of work in an office or perform their function properly. Also they hinder those who are capable. For some of the capable, this annoyance and hindrance is intensified by thoughts of the financial sacrifices involved in public service compared to private industry. It is multiplied by the practice of some supervisors' giving incompetent personnel passing fitness reports and of others' giving incompetent or barely satisfactory personnel good reports for promotion up and out of the supervisor's section. This practice has an obvious adverse affect on morale. Whether the incompetent or barely satisfactory are retained because of the unwillingness of supervisors to face facts or because of the paper work involved in firing is open to question.

e. Broken promises to personnel. Often goals are established by some supervisors which are to be rewarded by grade raises or overseas trips. These rewards frequently do not materialize. Sometimes these broken promises are excusable; but more often than not, they are inexcusable and are covered up by a lack of frankness and even duplicity on the part of the supervisor. Psychologically it is incorrect to establish goals and to fail to make the expected reward. Ethically, a lack of frankness and honor is also incorrect. Perhaps the basis of clandestine activity is deceit, but it should not dominate all relationships. In an environment of suspicion and uncertainty, there exists the need for personal honor and responsibility to create the trust and confidence necessary if the relationship between the case officer and the agent (who is risking his career and sometimes his life) is to be a productive one in the long run. The same confidence and trust should exist between all employees and their supervisors. All supervisors should be administrators as well as operators.

f. The failure of the organizational set up to give the individual a sense of importance or pride in his work. Work is divided up so that two or three people often handle the same subject and consequently, no one masters that subject. This division also tends to decrease efficiency and speed in getting

- 4 -

SECRET

a particular job done. What every person needs is the feeling that he is an expert or at least essential to his desk on at least one matter--that he has ownership of something. The individual also needs to feel that he is being worked to his full potential--that his supervisor is watching him grow in capability and gradually preparing for bigger things. Some supervisors fail to recognize that their responsibility includes a personnel responsibility as well as an operational one if the latter is to be met properly.

g. The failure of the Agency to fill some of its posts overseas. This failure leaves some important, though unfavorably situated stations undermanned while Headquarters and other stations in a more favorable environment are overstaffed. This failure is rooted in the reluctance of the Agency to order qualified personnel to posts. The reluctance of qualified personnel to volunteer for such assignments is understandable, for there is no assurance that they will be compensated by getting a desirable duty station on their next overseas assignment or even replaced on time when their tour is up. What is needed is a real career service willing to ensure adequate compensation in the form of personnel assignments and career guidance. People with western Europe or other plush assignments should not be permitted to have a monopoly on these posts without special reason. This deficiency results in the necessity of sometimes assigning unqualified personnel to fill the vacant slots (the body concept), in the sending of personnel on a TDY basis to the station at great expense to the Agency, in the leaving of station personnel in the field overworked and with poor morale, or even in forcing personnel to extend their tours at a hardship post because no replacement for them has been found.

8. All of these obstacles to good morale and high Headquarters efficiency could be ameliorated and even eliminated. But improvement in these matters are slow to come. A real apathy to honest self-criticism is apparent. Excuses of the Agency being a young organization are not really satisfactory. Attempts at reorganization will not succeed until someone with sufficient power is willing to take responsibility for initiating a shakeup to create a small, efficient, and devoted Central Intelligence Agency out of the present massive bureaucracy. Those of us on a lower level lacking any sort of authority can do nothing about it except voice constructive criticism. To wait the number of years required for the necessary advancement might be fatally frustrating and stifling. My hope is only that

someone with sufficient power and influence will see fit to initiate ameliorative changes. The function of the Agency is so important and offers so much potential for imaginative work that the United States deserves that someone be willing to undertake this task. The many devoted and capable Agency employees also deserve it. But the prospect at present is discouraging.



25X1

SECRET

STAT

Approved For Release 2003/08/27 : CIA-RDP60-00594A000200050006-4

Approved For Release 2003/08/27 : CIA-RDP60-00594A000200050006-4